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I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether to characterize a nonparticipating royalty
interest ("NPRI") in oil and gas as an interest in real property or an interest in
personal property is an unsettled but important question with significant
implications for West Virginia property jurisprudence, particularly given the
recent and dramatic increase in oil and gas development in West Virginia.
While other jurisdictions settled this issue years ago, West Virginia courts have
only recognized the NPRI as a distinct and separable facet of mineral
ownership and have not classified this ownership interest.' To draw upon the
proverbial "bundle of sticks" analogy, the NPRI was recognized as a "stick" in
the "bundle of sticks",2 that describes real property rights, specifically mineral
ownership. 3 Despite 50 years of silence on this issue from West Virginia's lone
appellate court, the definitive characterization of NPRIs is important in
numerous legal contexts including recordation of title, estate administration,
choice of law doctrine, partition actions, and tax sales.
This Article asks: just what is the legal nature of the NPRI stick within
the bundle? This Article concludes that an NPRI should be characterized as a
non-possessory real property interest in the form of an incorporeal
hereditament 4 that vests upon conveyance, not as a possessory real property
interest or personal property interest. West Virginia law recognizes that an
interest in oil and gas in place is a real property interest. 5 But the bundle of
I
2

See Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81-82 (W. Va. 1963).
The "bundle of sticks" analogy was first introduced in 1923 by Wesley N. Hohfeld and was

expounded upon by A.M. Honor&. See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property,
43 UCLA L. REv. 711, 712 (1996) ("[T]he bundle of rights thesis is a combination of Wesley
Hohfeld's analysis of rights and A. M. Honor6's description of the incidents of ownership."). The
analogy is generally used to discuss property theory and most law students learn the analogy in
their first-year property class, but it is also useful for understanding the distinct elements of
mineral ownership.
3

See Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 80-82.

4

An incorporeal hereditament is defined as "[an intangible right in land, such as an

easement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (9th ed. 2009).
5
See Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267, 269 (W. Va. 1945).
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sticks that comprises an undivided real property interest in minerals can be
broken into its component sticks, which may include the executive or leasing
right, an NPRI, and, in some states, a non-executive mineral interest. 6
The answer to the question posed by this Article requires an
examination of West Virginia oil and gas jurisprudence dating back to the late
1800s. West Virginia law is well-settled that an interest in the oil and gas in
place is a real property interest, while an interest in the produced oil and gas
(i.e., an accrued royalty interest in minerals) is a personal property interest.7
That is, once oil and gas are produced from a formation and brought to the
surface, they cease to be real property and become personal property.
An owner of an NPRI has a personal property interest in the royalties
received upon production, but the unanswered question is how to classify an
NPRI in the undeveloped minerals, or in other words, an unaccrued royalty
interest. The majority of jurisdictions and authoritative commentators appear to
treat an NPRI as a form of a real property interest called an "incorporeal
hereditament," which is an intangible right in land akin to an easement. 9
Conversely, there is also law in West Virginia that supports the alternative
characterization of an NPRI as a personal property interest that vests upon
production of the oil and gas. 10 However, characterizing an NPRI as personal
property conflicts with majority theory and is pregnant with problems.
Part II of this Article will address the creation of NPRIs and royalty
interests. Part III of this Article will set forth the two major competing property
interest theories: the Real Property Theory, which treats NPRIs as real property
interests in the form of incorporeal hereditaments, and the Personal Property
Theory, which treats NPRIs as personal property interests that vest upon
production of the minerals. In this part, the Article will examine the majority of
jurisdictions' treatment of the issue, Kansas's minority approach and reasoning,
and the significant criticism the Personal Property Theory has received. Part IV
will discuss the implications of these theories for the rule against perpetuities,
recordation of title, choice of law doctrine, partition actions, tax sales, and West
Virginia jurisprudence generally. Part V recommends that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals adopt the Real Property Theory .in its treatment of
NPRIs. The Real Property Theory represents the majority and better-reasoned
6

A non-executive mineral interest is defined as "an interest in oil and gas that lacks the right

to join in the execution of oil and gas leases and (probably) the right to develop." 8-N PATRICK H.
MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 684 (2013) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS & MEYERS 2013]. As Williams & Meyers explain, "the practical difference between a
nonparticipating royalty and a nonexecutive mineral interest is that the latter shares in bonus and
delay rental as well as royalty under existing and future leases[, while] [t]he former shares in
royalty only." Id.
7
See Warren v. Boggs, 97 S.E. 589, 592 (W. Va. 1918).
8
See id.
9
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (9th ed. 2009).
10

See infra Part III.B.
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approach than the Personal Property Theory. Adopting the Real Property
Theory will provide certainty for everyone, from legal practitioners to operators
in the Appalachian Basin, who must deal with NPRIs and who inevitably
wonder how to characterize NPRIs under West Virginia law.
Ii.

NPRls & THE ACCRUED VS. UNACCRUED ROYALTY DISTINCTION

A. NPRIs Depend on "The Kindness of Strangers"

One prominent oil and gas attorney aptly describes an NPRI as "an
interest.., that depends on the kindness of strangers" because "accrual of such
royalty [from production] is completely dependent upon the actions of the
holder of the executive rights . . . l
An NPRI is a pure royalty interest that is carved out of fee title to a
mineral estate by grant or reservation. 12 The only incident of mineral ownership
possessed by the NPRI owner is the right to a share in the proceeds from the
produced or developed minerals. 13 In contrast, a person with a mineral interest
in fee possesses the right to execute leases and to receive bonuses, delay
rentals, and royalties under a lease. 14 Thus, an NPRI owner has the right to
receive proceeds from the production of oil and gas, but has no right to
participate in developing the mineral estate that may lead to such production. 15
1

Benjamin Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems in Allocation of Production to
Owners of Non-ParticipatingRoyalty Interests in the Era of HorizontalDrilling,44 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 771, 799 (2013) (quoting Allen D. Cummings, Pooling and Community Leases: Problems
and Options for the Executive Owner, the Non-Executive Owner and the Lessee, 1997 15TH
ANNUAL ADVANCED OIL, GAS & MINERAL LAW COURSE I-1, 1-2); see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS
2013, supra note 6 (An NPRI is "an expense-free interest in oil or gas, as, if and when produced.
The prefix 'non-participating' indicates that the interest does not share in bonus or rental, nor in
the right to execute leases or to explore and develop.").
12
RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.5 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
HEMINGWAY 1]; see also HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION § 2.5(C) (Owen L.
Anderson et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter HEMINGWAY II] ("In jurisdictions that view
royalty as a real property interest, a nonparticipating royalty interest can be conveyed or reserved
apart from the mineral estate."); Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Overriding
Royalty Interests and NonparticipatingRoyalty Interests, Whether Payable in Value or in Kind,
Be Subject to the Same Valuation StandardAs Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 17
(2000) ("[N]onparticipating royalty interests ... are carved from the fee title.").
13 See Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963).
14 See id.
15 See C. J. Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual NonParticipatingRoyalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TEX. L. REv. 369, 384-85 (1954); 38 AM. JUR.
2D Gas and Oil § 196 (2014) ("A nonparticipating gas and oil royalty is a nonpossessory interest
that does not entitle the owner to produce the gas and oil himself or herself, but does entitle the
owner to a certain share of the production proceeds, free of the expenses of exploration and
production."); 53A AM. JUR. 2D Mines and Minerals § 168 (2014) ("A 'nonparticipating royalty'
is an interest in minerals which is nonpossessory, which means that it does not entitle the owner
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In Davis v. Hardman, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals set
forth the distinguishing characteristics of an NPRI versus an interest in oil and
gas in place:
The distinguishing characteristics of a non-participating royalty
interest are: (1)Such share of production is not chargeable with
any of the costs of discovery and production; (2) the owner has
no right to do any act or thing to discover and produce the oil
and gas; (3) the owner has no right to grant leases; and (4) the
owner has no right to receive bonuses or delay rentals.
Conversely, the distinguishing characteristics of an interest in
minerals in place are: (1) Such interest is not free of costs of
discovery and production; (2) the owner has the right to do any
and all acts necessary to discover and produce oil and gas; (3)
the owner has the right to grant leases, and 4) the owner has
the right to receive bonuses and delay rentals.
Aside from Davis, there is little West Virginia case law analyzing the
nature of NPRIs. Looking to the contours of NPRI jurisprudence in other
jurisdictions where NPRls are considered real property, NPRIs can be of a
perpetual
or lesser18duration 17 and can be created before or after an oil and gas
lease is executed.

to produce minerals her- or himself or permit him or her to join in leases of the mineral estate,
but merely entitles him or her to a certain share of the production under the lease, free of
expenses of exploration and production."); HEMINGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5 ("[A] 'nonparticipating' royalty interest.., will not share in the right to lease, or in the other economic
benefits from an oil and gas lease.").
16 Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 81-82 (quoting Mounger v. Pittman, 108 So. 2d 565, 566 (Miss.
1959)).
17
See HEMINGWAY II, supra note 12, § 2.5(C); see also 53A AM. JUR. 2D Mines and Minerals
§ 168 ("The reservation or grant of a royalty interest prior to the lease of the subject property is
generally termed a 'perpetual nonparticipating royalty,' if no right is granted or reserved to
participate in the making of future leases.").
18 See HEMINGWAY 11, supra note 12, § 2.5(C). An example of language used to create an
NPRI is seen in Davis v. Hardman:
There is reserved for the benefit of Alva L. Davis, his heirs and assigns, his
proportionateshare of one-fourth (1) of the rest and residue of the oil and
gas royalty, when produced, in and under said land, but said second party,
his heirs and assigns, to have the right to lease said land for oil and gas
purposes and to receive the bonuses and carrying rentals.
133 S.E.2d at 78 (emphasis added). The italicized language creates the NPRI. An NPRI owner
only has the right to receive royalties; he does not have any rights to sign leases or receive delay
rentals or bonuses.
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B. Accrued vs. UnaccruedRoyalties
It is useful to understand the distinction between accrued and
unaccrued royalties when understanding how to characterize NPRIs. Generally
speaking, "[u]naccrued royalties are royalties that will be earned on minerals
that have not yet been severed from the ground .... Accrued royalties are
royalties due on minerals that have been severed." 19 Courts unanimously hold
that royalties that have accrued from production and severance of the minerals
constitute personal property.2 0 However, courts have not so consistently agreed
upon how to characterize unaccrued royalties, i.e., royalties to be paid from
future production under a lease.21 The clear majority of jurisdictions treat an
interest in unaccrued royalty as a real property interest, while prevailing
in
authority in Kansas takes the minority position
22 and treats an interest
interest.
property
personal
a
as
royalty
unaccrued
III. ARE NPRIS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY? THE Two COMPETING
THEORIES

NPRIs have been classified in two alternative ways: as real property or
as personal property. The approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions is the
Real Property Theory, which treats NPRIs as real property in the form of an
incorporeal hereditament. An incorporeal hereditament is an intangible right in
land.13 The minority approach is to treat NPRIs as personal property that vests
upon production. West Virginia law is, at best, unsettled as to whether an NPRI
should be treated as a real property or personal property interest.

19

ANR W. Coal Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 276 F.3d 957, 965 n.ll (8th Cir.

2002). See generally NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 49:24 (3d ed. 2004).
21

See HEMINGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5(B).
Id.

22

See id. For a detailed compilation of authority regarding "accrued" and "unaccrued"

20

royalties and their classifications as either personalty or realty, see Martin J. McMahon,
Annotation, Oil and Gas Royalty as Real or PersonalProperty, 56 A.L.R. 4th 539 (1987).
23
See supra note 4 for the definition of an incorporeal hereditament. Under West Virginia
law, "[a]n easement, whether affirmative or negative, is an incorporeal hereditament and as such
is a species of real property." Bennet v. Charles Corp., 226 S.E.2d 559, 563 (W. Va. 1976).
Additionally, in the context of public energy and the power of eminent domain, the Legislature
has defined real property interests to include "easements, . . . leases, licenses and all other
incorporeal hereditaments. :.." W. VA. CODE § 5D-1-5(14) (2014).
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The Real Property Theory: Treating NPRIs as Incorporeal
Hereditaments

The majority of jurisdictions treat NPRIs as they would any unaccrued
royalty interest: as real property.24 In such jurisdictions, an NPRI is treated as
an incorporeal, or non-possessory, real property interest. 25 The seminal case
analyzing the character of an NPRI as real property is the Arkansas case of
Hanson v. Ware,2 6 which held that an NPRI is a real property interest in the
nature of an incorporeal hereditament 27 that immediately vests at the time of
conveyance. The timing of vestment is central to the Real Property Theory
adopted by the Arkansas court: because the perpetual NPRI vested at the time
of conveyance, it did not violate the "rule against perpetuities," which
invalidates interests in property unless they vest within a specified time
period.28
The Hanson approach set forth by the Arkansas court has been
followed in a majority of jurisdictions, including Florida, Indiana, New
24

See Thomas J. Files, Recording of Instruments Affecting Oil and Gas Interest in Federal

Lands, 3 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18 (1957) ("[A]n unaccrued oil and gas royalty interest,
whether it is a royalty under an existing lease only, a royalty under an existing lease together with
a proportionate interest in the minerals in place, a royalty interest under existing or future leases,
or a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest created before or after a lease, is everywhere held
to be real property and an interest in land."). As Hemingway explains, in jurisdictions which
view royalty as a real property interest, a conveyance of an NPRI "may be made prior to the
execution of an oil and gas lease, or at a time when a lease is presently outstanding. In the latter
event, the conveyance would usually include a right to royalty under the present lease as well as
the right to royalty out of future production." See HEMINGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5(C).
25 Joshua M. Morse III & Jaimie A. Ross, New Remedies for Executive Duty Breaches: The
Courts Should Throw JR. Ewing Out of the Oil Patch, 40 ALA. L. REv. 187, 194 (1988) ("Most
states define the nonparticipating royalty interest as a cost-free incorporeal real property interest
in gross mineral production.").
26
See 274 S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955).
27

See supra note 23.

28

See Hanson, 274 S.W.2d at 362-63 ("In the analogous case of a profit at prendre, such as

the perpetual right to take game or fish from another's land, the estate in real property is a present
vested interest which is unaffected by the rule against perpetuities."). The rule against
perpetuities is
the common-law rule prohibiting a grant of an estate unless the interest must
vest, if at all, no later than 21 years (plus a period of gestation to cover a
posthumous birth) after the death of some person alive when the interest was
created. The purpose of the rule was to limit the time that title to property
could be suspended out of commerce because there was no owner who had
title to the property and who could sell it or exercise other aspects of
ownership. If the terms of the contract or gift exceeded the time limits of the
rule, the gift or transaction was void.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (9th ed. 2009). See infra Part IV.A for an in-depth discussion of
the rule against perpetuities and the challenge it presents to characterizing perpetual NPRIs as
personal property. As discussed in Part IV.A, infra, one of the theoretical flaws of the Personal
Property Theory is that it causes perpetual NPRIs to run afoul of the rule against perpetuities.
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Mexico, Tennessee, and Wyoming,2 9 and praised by notable commentators.3 °
These courts have compared the NPRI to several types of incorporeal
hereditaments: a profit d prendre,3' a real covenant running with the land,32
common-law rent,33 or a covenant in aid of rent. 4
In sum, the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the view that an
NPRI is a real property interest akin to an incorporeal hereditament, though the
particular kind of incorporeal hereditament to which an NPRJ is analogized

29

See, e.g., Conway Land, Inc. v. Terry, 542 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1989); Wedel v. Am. Elec.

Power Serv. Corp., 681 N.E.2d 1122, 1136-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Price v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
447 P.2d 509, 510 (N.M. 1968); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enters., Inc., 645 S.W.2d 410, 414
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 932 (Wyo. 1964); see also
Conway, 542 So. 2d at 365 ("'It is submitted that the result and reasoning in Hanson v. Ware is
sound, as applied both to royalty and to non-executive mineral interests, and upon analytical and
policy grounds. It should be accepted in all states .... ') (citing 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 323 (1985)). For additional discussion of how specific states classify mineral,
royalty, and leasehold interests, see 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS 2013, supra note 6, § 214.
30
See HEMtNGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5(C) ("Since the rule [against perpetuities] operates
only against interests that are contingent in nature, in jurisdictions where royalty is considered to
be real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, a vested perpetual interest in
royalty should not violate the rule. Although the cases are few, this view is apparently followed
in most jurisdictions.").
31
Profit 6 prendre is defined as "[a] right or privilege to go on another's land and take away
something of value from its soil or from the products of its soil (as by mining, logging, or

hunting)."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1330 (9th ed. 2009).

A real covenant running with the land is defined as "[a] covenant intimately and inherently
involved with the land and therefore binding subsequent owners and successor grantees
indefinitely." Id. at 421.
33
"Rent [is] an interest closely akin to real covenants. Rent is an ancient and somewhat
mysterious concept. After the statute Quia Emptores, three forms of rent were recognized in
England.... Our concern is with the concept of rent as an incorporeal hereditament, a 'right in
the land of another,' which runs with the servient estate in perpetuity." Meyers, supra note 15, at
411.
34
See, e.g., Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (Ark. 1955) (analogizing to a profit 6
prendre); Denney v. Teel, 688 P.2d 803, 809 (Okla. 1984) (In dicta, the court reasoned that an
NPRI "has been analogized to the incorporeal hereditament of common-law rent... [and] [slince
royalty is inherently subject to another's power to lease, it would not, under one theory, be
subject to the rule against perpetuities.") (applying Kentucky law to determine that a royalty is a
real property interest, but deferring to Kentucky courts to ultimately decide whether a perpetual
NPRI would be subject to the rule against perpetuities); Meyers, supra note 15, at 408-15
(discussing alternative classifications of NPRIs as real covenants running with the land, rent, and
covenants in aid of rent). As Meyers states regarding covenants in aid of rent,
[a]dhering to the view that non-executive mineral interests are incorporeal
hereditaments running with the mineral estate, we may observe one further
analysis. If it be conceded that royalty may be assimilated to common-law
rent, then the covenant to pay bonus, rental, and royalty may be regarded as a
real covenant in aid of rent, unembarrassed for the most part by the restrictive
rules concerning other real covenants.
32

Id. at 414.
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differs with the jurisdiction. The Real Property Theory appears to be better
reasoned than the Personal Property Theory as it avoids invalidation due to the
rule against perpetuities.
B. The PersonalProperty Theory: TreatingNPRIs as Interests in
PersonalProperty Vesting upon Production
The Personal Property Theory, which treats NPRIs as personal property
interests that vest upon production, is the minority view. In fact, as noted by
one commentator, Kansas and perhaps only one or two other jurisdictions adopt
this theory. 3' Kansas treats unaccrued royalty interests, including NPRIs, as
personal property interests that are subject to the rule against perpetuities. 36 An
examination of Kansas's adoption of the Personal Property Theory is useful to
understand this approach's contours and why the Real Property Theory is the
preferred approach.
In Cosgrove v. Young, 37 the Kansas Supreme Court held that a
conveyance of a royalty interest is void for violating the rule against
perpetuities if the instrument of conveyance does not require execution and
delivery of gas leases at a future time, i.e., fails to vest title.3 8 In reaching this
conclusion, the Cosgrove court relied heavily upon Lathrop v. Eyestone,39 a
quiet title action in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that a royalty interest
is personal property. 40 The Cosgrove court reasoned that:
[i]f it is not certain the vesting will occur within the time stated
in the rule [against perpetuities], then the rule has been violated
and the conveyance is void. Even if an oil and gas lease were
required to be executed within the time prescribed by law,
there would still be no vesting of title until royalty becomes
due and payable to the grantor or his successor. 4'
The Cosgrove court noted that more than 31 years had passed since the
conveyance; therefore, the conveyance was void because it violated the rule

35
See HEMINGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5(B) (citing cases from Kansas, Ohio, Illinois, and a
federal court in Mississippi as treating a lessor's interest in unaccrued royalty as a personal
property interest); see also HEMINGWAY II, supra note 12, § 2.5(B) (citing the same jurisdictions,
as well as a Board of Tax Appeals case from the Tenth Circuit).
36
See HEMINGWAY I, supra note 12, § 2.5(C); see also HEMINGWAY II, supra note 12, §

2.5(C).
37
642 P.2d 75 (Kan. 1982).
38
Id. at 77-83 (citing Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136, 140-41 (Kan. 1951)).
39
227 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1951).
40
Id. at 143-44.
41

642 P.2d at 83.
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against perpetuities. 42 In reaching this conclusion, the Cosgrove court
acknowledged that "some other jurisdictions might well reach a different result
in applying their case law to the issue herein. However, the parties hereto seek
of our existing case law and we see no compelling reason for
no alteration
43
change.
Although the Cosgrove majority saw no reason to overrule Lathrop and
discard the problematic Kansas rule that an NPRI is a personal property interest
subject to the rule against perpetuities, many others have seen compelling
reasons for change and have voiced these opinions. Beginning with the dissent
to Cosgrove, Justice Harold S. Herd commented that Lathrop "was written to
apply narrowly to sales of a future interest dependent upon a condition
precedent to vesting. The majority opinion extends the rule against perpetuities
to all sales of oil and gas royalty in Kansas which extend beyond the twentyJustice Herd noted that Lathrop is "peculiar to Kansas" and
one years ....
has been disapproved of by authoritative commentators and other courts.45
Justice Herd concluded that "[i]n theory, I would reverse Lathrop v.46Eyestone
and make Kansas law conform to the better rule of Hanson v. Ware."
In Rucker v. DeLay,47 the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged many
calls to overrule Cosgrove and Lathrop but declined to take action. The Rucker
court was urged by one of the parties and amicus curiae to overrule Lathrop
and Cosgrove.48 The Rucker court acknowledged that these cases have been
"criticized as conceptually invalid" and that other Kansas decisions, decided
cases. 4 9
after Lathrop but before Cosgrove, are difficult to reconcile with these
The Rucker court concluded that "[t]he criticism about this court's prior vesting
analysis has some merit" and declined "to extend it to royalty interests reserved
in the grantor.", 50 Nonetheless, the Rucker court ultimately decided to not

42

Id. at 84.

43

Id.
Id. at 89 (Herd, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 89-90 (citing 3A SAINT-PAUL, supra note 19, § 576 at 31-32; 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, OIL
& GAS, § 17.3 at 392-93 (1989); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS 2013, supra note 6, § 323 at 13-16, §
324.4 at 59-60).
46
642 P.2d at 90 (Herd, J., dissenting).
44

47
48

289 P.3d 1166 (Kan. 2012).
Id. at 1172.

49
Id. at 1172-73 (citing Froelich v. United Royalty Co., 290 P.2d 93 (Kan. 1955) (upholding
a nonparticipating mineral interest because it vested immediately), modified on reh 'g, 297 P.2d
1106 (Kan. 1956); Howell v. Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 271 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1954) (upholding lease
agreement provision creating overriding royalty interest in future leases because the interest
vested when the assignment was made and accepted); Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 245
P.2d 176 (Kan. 1952) (upholding lease agreement's unitization clause and royalty interest
agreement because those interests vested upon the lease's execution and delivery)).
Id. at 1173.
50
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overrule Lathrop and Cosgrove because the issue was "not squarely before
[it] .'
In sum, Kansas's adoption of the Personal Property Theory has
received considerable criticism, 2 and, if the Rucker court's acknowledgement
of the severity of that criticism is any indication of its proclivity to overrule
Lathrop and Cosgrove, the Kansas approach is not likely to remain good law
for much longer. As one commentator noted, the Kansas approach certainly
causes more "shale era disputes" revolving around the rule against perpetuities
and the classification of nonparticipating
royalty interests.13 This only further
54
field.
the
governing
entangles the law
C. West Virginia Law Regarding the Characterizationof NPRls Is
Unsettled
Unlike other oil and gas jurisdictions, West Virginia has scant authority
addressing the proper characterization of NPRIs. On the one hand, West
Virginia law has long considered an interest in oil and gas in place as a real
property interest, and any interest in produced or developed minerals is a

51
52

Id.
The Supreme Court of Florida notes that Kansas's approach has received much criticism

from scholars. Conway Land, Inc. v. Terry, 524 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1989) (citing 1 KuNTz,
supra note 45, §§ 15.4, 17.3 (1987); 3A W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 605 (1958); 2
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 323 (1985); Meyers, supra note 15, at 375).

53 See Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving PerennialProblems in the
Shale Era, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 97, 132-36 (2013) (citing as an example Drach v. Ely, 703 P.2d
746 (Kan. 1985) (where "the Kansas Supreme Court again avoided the rule against perpetuities
by interpreting a grant as creating a non-participating mineral interest" (emphasis added))). One
commentator offered the following criticism of the Drach court's approach:
Ironically, the grantor's express retention of these elements of a mineral
interest helped to establish, in the court's view, that the conveyed interests
were mineral interests and not royalty interests. The court concluded that the
conveyance was of undivided shares of the mineral estate, nonparticipating in
rentals and bonuses. Consequently, the conveyance did not violate the rule
against perpetuities, as it would have if the court had construed it to be the
conveyance of royalty interests. This result was prompted, in part, by the
general view that courts should favor a construction that complies with the
rule against perpetuities over one that violates the rule. A more forthright
approach would have been to overrule the Kansas view that perpetual
nonparticipating royalty interests violate the rule against perpetuities. Kansas
is alone in holding this view, which is unsupported by logic or policy.
Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Recent Developments in Kansas Oil and Gas Law (1983-1988), 37 U.
KAN. L. REv. 907, 925-26 (1989) (citations omitted). As is clear from Mr. DeLaTorre's
discussion, a non-executive mineral interest contains more rights than an NPRI: "a non-executive
mineral interest includes bonus or rental in addition to royalty, while a non-participating royalty
interest is limited solely to proceeds derived from the production of oil or gas." Meyers, supra
note 15, at 384.
54 See Burney, supra note 53, at 132-36.
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personal property interest.55 On the other hand, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has not extended these principles of law to NPRIs. Although
there is case law in West Virginia to support the Personal Property Theory,
there are several significant reasons why the Personal Property Theory should
be rejected as problematic. These reasons are discussed below and are
contrasted with the benefits provided by adhering to the Real Property Theory.
1. The Problem with the Personal Property Theory
Following Kansas's approach, the following argument can be made
that an NPRI is a personal property interest under West Virginia law: because
an NPRI owner, by definition, has an interest in the minerals only once those
minerals are produced from the ground, an NPRI interest arises only once the
minerals have transitioned from real property to personal property by virtue of
production. In other words, an NPRI owner's interest only vests upon
production and is therefore a personal property interest.
A series of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decisions lends
some support to the argument that a royalty interest arises only upon production
of the minerals and that any interest in produced or developed minerals is a
personal property interest. 56 Warren v. Boggs established the basic tenant of
West Virginia law that when oil or gas is "brought to the surface and reduced to
.."57
possession[,] it ceases to be real estate and becomes personalproperty..
Relying on Warren, the court held in McIntosh II that a conveyance of royalty
was a personal covenant rather than a real covenant running with the land.58
The conveyance of royalty employed the following language: "[b]ut if oil or
gas is found in paying quantities on said lands, first party and her assigns shall
yield and pay to parties of the second party or their assigns, one full sixteenth
(1/16) of the oil and gas produced and marketed from said lands., 59 The court
reasoned that use of the term "produced" in the conveyance made "clear that it
were to be vested upon
was not intended by the grantor that the grantees
'60
property.
real
in
interest
any
of
deed
the
of
delivery
Most recently, in Davis, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
analyzed an oil and gas conveyance to determine whether the interest conveyed
was an interest in the oil and gas in place or only a royalty interest in the oil and

55 See Consol. Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 247 S.E.2d 712, 715 n.4 (W. Va. 1978); Boggess v.
Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267, 269 (W. Va. 1945); Warren v. Boggs, 97 S.E. 589, 592 (W. Va. 1918).
56 See Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963); McIntosh v. Vail (McIntosh II), 28

S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1943); Warren v. Boggs, 97 S.E. 589 (W. Va. 1918).
57 97 S.E. at 592 (emphasis added).
58 McIntosh 11,28 S.E.2d at 615.
59 Id. at 608.
Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
60
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gas once produced. 6' The Davis court acknowledged that inconsistent usage of
the term "royalty" "has resulted in great confusion" and that "it is helpful to
bear in mind the meaning of certain terms as they are used and understood in
the oil and gas industry. '' 62 The court then held that language reserving or
granting a royalty does not include rentals and income with that royalty; if it
does, it is a reservation of minerals in place, not a pure royalty. 63 In support of
this holding, the Davis court reasoned that use of the term "when produced"
makes clear that the grant or reservation is not an interest of the oil and gas in
place but rather a "royalty interest which would follow production of oil or gas,
or both." 64 In defining "royalty," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
explained that "'[tjhe concept of royalty always
presupposes development or
' 65
production of the mineral to which it relates."'
By applying these principles in the context of the NPRI, one could
argue that given the nature of an NPRI-that is, an interest in the produced or
developed gas only and not the minerals in the ground-it is reasonable to
conclude that an NPRI owner does not have a property interest until the
minerals are brought to the surface and produced. Therefore, at the moment that
the NPRI owner's interest vests in the produced minerals, those minerals
simultaneously cease to be real estate and become personal property.66
Accordingly, under the very definition of an NPRI, there is no opportunity for
its holder to have an interest in the minerals in place-i.e., a real property
interest. Insum, under this theory of West Virginia law, the NPRI owner can
only have a personal property interest. However, this theory contains several
flaws that mitigate against its adoption.
2.

West Virginia Law Supporting the Personal Property Theory Is
Inconsistent and Outdated

Much of the West Virginia case law that one could use to support the
Personal Property Theory is either inconsistent or outdated. McIntosh 11 was
one of two cases decided on the same day in 1943, and it appeared to flatly
contradict its companion decision.67 Although the instruments under

61
62
63

64
65
66

133 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 88, 80.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (citing McIntosh v. Vail, 28 S.E.2d 95, 97 (W. Va. 1943)).
See McIntosh 11, 28 S.E.2d at 610 ("When oil and gas is produced and marketed from said

lands, it loses its character of real property and, as shown in the Warren case, assumes the quality
of personal property.").
67
See McIntosh v. Vail (McIntosh 1), 28 S.E.2d 95, 96 (W. Va. 1943); McIntosh II, 28 S.E.2d
at 607.
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examination in McIntosh I and McIntosh II used very similar language, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reached different conclusions.
In McIntosh I, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered
the following language: "[b]ut in the event of oil or gas being developed on
said land, said second party or his assigns shall be entitled to one full sixteenth
of all oil marketed and one half of the next [sic] proceeds from all gas sold
from next land."68 The parties argued that the issue presented by this language
was whether it created a real or personal covenant, but the court disagreed with
their presentation of the issue and said that "this appraisal of the provision is
inadequate and [we think] that a right or interest more substantial than a mere
covenant was created., 69 As it observed seven years later in Collins v.
Stalnaker,70 the court said the issue that the McIntosh I court actually decided
was whether the minerals were "embraced in the reservation contained in the
deed.', 71 The McIntosh I court did not explicitly state that a nonparticipating
royalty interest was a real property interest or a real covenant running with the
land-only that the interest at issue was "more substantial than a mere
covenant."72
In contrast, in McIntosh II, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals considered the following similar language: "[b]ut if oil or gas is found
in paying quantities on said lands, first party and her assigns shall yield andpay
to parties of the second party or their assigns, one full sixteenth (1/16) of the oil
and gas produced and marketed from said lands.",73 Despite its similarity to the
language at issue in McIntosh I, the McIntosh 11 court held that this conveyance
of royalty was a personal covenant rather than a real covenant running with the
land. 4 This holding supports the argument that an NPRI is not a real property
interest.
However, McIntosh I1 was strongly criticized by two dissenting judges
as having been incorrectly decided. In his vigorous dissent, Judge Fred L. Fox,
with Judge William T. Lovins joining, stated that McIntosh II should have
followed the reasoning of McIntosh L 7 Judge Fox viewed a royalty interest as
an interest in real property, regardless of whether it was a real covenant running
with the land.76 He determined that there was no difference between the

68

McIntosh I, 28 S.E.2d at 96 (emphasis added).

69

Id.

70

48 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1948).

71

Id. at 434.

72

McIntosh I, 28 S.E.2d at 96.

73
74

McIntosh 11, 28 S.E.2d 607, 608 (W. Va. 1943) (emphasis added).
Id. at 612.

75

Id. at 614-15 (Fox, J., dissenting).

76

Id.
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language in the two conveyances of McIntosh I and McIntosh I 7 7 He then
opined, "It may be that it is correctly described as a covenant running with the
land. I prefer to treat it as an interest in land, which passed to the grantees
under the deed, and which would pass by conveyance of the land, unless
specifically reserved., 7 8 Judge Fox further reasoned that treating a
nonparticipating royalty interest as an interest in land is correct because it will
vest immediately and provides certainty of title:
The law favors certainty in the vesting of estates, and this
applies particularly to lands and interests in lands, for the
reason that the free transmission of title thereto is supposed to
encourage use and development and is, therefore, in the public
interest. Were we to hold the oil and gas interest here involved
to be such as passed with the land, where not reserved, there
would never be any question as to its ownership; or, if reserved
or separated from the surface, it would necessarily be by
recordable writing, and thus the owner could be located. On the
other hand, if we treat it as a personal estate, or a personal
covenant, the real ownership of the interest may be difficult, if
not impossible, to locate.79

Ultimately, Judge Fox concluded that the royalty interest in question "passed
by the granting clause of the deed and then became fully vested in the owners
of the land conveyed, and was at all times an interest attached to the ownership
of the land.",80 Judge Fox stated that this reasoning is the same as that applied in
McIntosh I and that applying this reasoning "decree[s] the same result" in both
cases. 81 The reasoning set forth by Judge Fox in the McIntosh II dissent
comports with the Real Property Theory adopted in a majority of jurisdictions.
Furthermore, Warren, the cornerstone case for the argument that West
Virginia may view an NPRI as personal property, may be unsuitable for
attempting to characterize royalty interests for the purpose of modem partition
actions because at the time it was decided, West Virginia law did not allow for
partition in kind of oil and gas. 8 2 In Warren, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that "[r]oyalty in oil brought to the surface is 'personal
property' and as such is susceptible of partition among its coowners." Additionally, the court notes that it is not "dealing with the
Id. at 615 ("What is the real difference between the two expressions? I do not think there is
any. There is nothing sacrosanct in these expressions.").
78
Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
77

79

Id. at 616 (emphasis added).

80

Id. at 613.
Id. at 615.

81
82

83

See Warren v. Boggs, 97 S.E. 589 (W. Va. 1918).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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a case involving the right to

partition oil and gas in place where the ownership of the minerals had been
separated from the ownership of the overlying surface. 84
In Hall v. Vernon,85 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that oil and gas owned by co-owners could not be partitioned in kind, only by
sale and division of the proceeds. 86 The court's decision was based upon the
notion that:
oil and gas are fugitive, and that co-owners of them, not
owning the surface, have a mere right to explore for them, and
that it is impossible to partition the same in kind, owing to the
nature of oil and gas, and that a court cannot be called on to do
an impossible thing, and has no jurisdiction to partition such a
right by87allotting gas and oil under certain sections of the
surface.

Twenty years later, the Warren court sought to avoid Hall's limitation
by highlighting the fact that once the mineral has been produced, the royalty
interest is personal property. 88 This allowed the parties to seek a division of the
royalty, instead of forcing a sale of all of their interests. 8 9 The Legislature
effectively overruled Hall in 1939 when it amended West Virginia Code
section 37-4-1 and established the right to partition mineral interests in kind, if
feasible. 90 Thus, Warren may be viewed as an attempt to sidestep an
inconvenient feature of the law that is now no longer in existence and therefore
should not be relied upon as decisive authority by the modem court.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHARACTERIZING NPRIS AS REAL OR PERSONAL

PROPERTY
West Virginia's potential treatment of NPRIs as personal property will
have important legal ramifications that impact the state's oil and gas
jurisprudence, NPRI owners, and operators. These consequences are explored
in the context of perpetual NPRIs, title recordation, choice of law, and oil and

84

Id. at 592 (citation omitted) (citing Hall v. Vernon, 34 S.E. 764 (W. Va. 1899)).

85

87

34 S.E. 764 (W. Va. 1899).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at 764.

88

See 97 S.E. at 592.

89

Id. at 593.
See Consol. Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 247 S.E.2d 712, 716 (W. Va. 1978) ("There can be

86

90

little doubt that the 1939 amendment must be construed to permit partition in kind of oil and gas
interest. By using the broad term 'minerals' and excluding the right of lessees of oil and gas to
partition in kind, it is obvious that the Legislature intended to include oil and gas interests within
the term 'minerals."' (emphasis added)).
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gas jurisprudence. In contrast, the potentially negative consequences of
classifying NPRIs as real property in the context of partition actions and tax
sales are avoidable by classifying NPRIs as incorporeal hereditaments.
A. PerpetualNPRIs Run Afoul of the Rule Against Perpetuities
If NPRIs are treated as a type of personal property that does not vest
until production, perpetual NPRIs violate "the rule against perpetuities." The
statutory rule against perpetuities, adopted in West Virginia in 1992, states that
any "nonvested property interest is invalid unless" it meets certain conditions,
namely that it is certain to vest or terminate within a specific timeframe. 91 As
explained by the Supreme Court of Florida in Conway Land, Inc. v. Terry, "the
rule that a royalty interest is personal property which does not vest until the oil
is severed from the ground" is "an attempt to create a perpetual
92
nonparticipating royalty interest [that] violates the rule against perpetuities.
Treating NPRIs as non-vesting personal property interests subject to
the rule against perpetuities would greatly complicate determining ownership
of NPRIs and may create an incentive for executive rights owners to holdout on
executing leases until such interests have expired. West Virginia adopted the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities in 1992, which set forth a "waitand-see" approach 93 that added an alternate 90-year period measured from the

91

See W. VA. CODE §§ 36-1A-I to -8(2014).

542 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1989) (discussing how Kansas "has squarely adopted" this
approach and has since had to invalidate NPRIs for being void under the rule against
perpetuities); see also Cosgrove v. Young, 642 P.2d 75, 83 (Kan. 1982) ("If it is not certain the
vesting will occur within the time stated in the rule, then the rule has been violated and the
conveyance is void. Even if an oil and gas lease were required to be executed within the time
prescribed by law, there would still be no vesting of title until royalty becomes due and payable
to the grantor or his successor."). For additional discussion on this topic, see 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS 2013, supra note 6, §§ 322-23.
93 The Uniform Law Commission, the drafter of the wait-and-see approach, explains:
Rather than invalidating future interests based on hypothetical possibilities,
the Uniform Statutory Rule provides a period of time within which an
interest can actually vest. If it does, it is saved. If it does not, then it is
invalid. We wait and see, in other words, if an interest will, in fact, vest.
92

The initial part of the Rule restates the common law and validates
interests that meet the basic test. The second part of the Uniform Statutory
Rule deals with invalidation. It sets a period of time, 90 years, within which
actual vesting validates an interest. Invalidation can occur only if the future
interest has not vested 90 years after its creation. We "wait and see" 90 years.
Why a fixed number of years? It is the simplest and least capricious way
to measure time. Why 90 years? To give ample time, within the lifetimes
involved in measuring these interests, for a nonvested future interest to vest.
Ninety years represents an estimate of the actual time most extended future
interests will take, at the outside, to vest. If they do not vest, 90 years is a
sufficient time to justify invalidating such interests.
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creation of the interest to allow for vesting. 94 Those wishing to determine
whether a perpetual NPRI is valid would be forced to undergo an analysis
similar to the analysis of whether a particular lease is held by production. As
experience has shown, this determination can be difficult where production
data is missing or incomplete. Furthermore, successors in interest to the
original grantor of the NPRI may be tempted to refrain from executing leases
until the 90-year period has expired so that the perpetual NPRI will be deemed
invalid, vesting such successors with the royalty rights. 95 From a legal
perspective, there are several reasons why NPRIs should be distinguished from
other property interests subject to the rule against perpetuities. One significant
reason is that the purpose of the rule against perpetuities-to prevent the tying
up of interests indefinitely-has no relevance to the NPRI holder because such
owners have no decision-making authority. 96 Another reason is that ownership
of an NPRI is choate; there is no possibility of contingent remaindermen or
reversion. As the Hanson court reasoned,
In [contingent remainderman cases,] the physical property is
known to exist; the uncertainty is whether the contingent
remainderman or some third person will eventually acquire the
absolute ownership. Here, however, no third person is
involved. The appellees' title being complete, the doubt is
occasioned not by the possibility that someone else may
acquire the property but by the possibility that there may be in
fact no oil and gas within the land. In short, the typical
contingent remainderman has an uncertain interest in the fee
simple, while
these appellees have a fee simple interest in the
97
uncertain.

Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Summary, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, available at http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=
Statutory+Rule+Against+Perpetuities (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
94
See W. VA. CODE §§ 36-1A-1 to -8.
95
While executive rights owners may be prohibited from doing so because of a fiduciary duty
owed to NPRI owners, West Virginia law is somewhat unclear as to the contours of this fiduciary
duty. See Donahue v. Bills, 305 S.E.2d 311, 312-13 (W. Va. 1983) ("Although the Bills[es] have
the right to lease, they are entitled only to one-half of the proceeds of the rental payments.
Furthermore, the Bills[es] must share any fees or other inducements they may receive for
entering into a lease with the Donahues on a fifty-fifty basis. In effect, the Bills[es] are
fiduciaries for the Donahues and will be held to strict fiduciary standards."). But see Ernest E.
Smith, Implications of a FiduciaryStandardof Conductfor the Holder of the Executive Right, 64
TEX. L. REV. 371, 406 n.167 (1985) (citing Discussion Note, Mineral Reservations: Grantor's
Retention of "Executive Right"-Validity and Function, 79 OIL & GAS REP. 372 (1984)) (noting
that one commentator "has suggested that the West Virginia court was applying the fiduciary
standard only in the context of the executive's obligation to account for moneys received").
96
See infra Part IV.E.4.
97

Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ark. 1955).
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Finally, from a practical standpoint, why tangle with the rule against
perpetuities when it can be avoided under the Real Property Theory?
B. Inability to Achieve ClearRecord Title

Classifying NPRIs as personal property will undercut the ability to
achieve clear record title when owners of NPRIs die, whether testate or
intestate. West Virginia law protects ownership of real property when proof of
98
that ownership is recorded in the county in which the real property is located.
West Virginia law also provides for recordation of foreign wills conveying real
property interest upon death in the county in which the realty is located. 99 In the
case of intestacy, a normal intestate administration may be opened in the
county in which the real estate is located; this probate will be ancillary to the
probate conducted in the decedent's domicile.1t° The intestate administration
process includes an appraisal of the property owned by the decedent at the time
of his or her death and a listing of the heirs who inherited that property. ot This
document should be recorded in the county in which the real property is
by
located. As Judge Fox recognized in his dissenting opinion in McIntosh I1,
classifying an interest as personal property, "the real ownership of the interest
may be difficult, if not impossible, to locate."10 2 But by classifying an NPRI as
an interest in real property, a full record of ownership of that NPRI may be
maintained in the county in which it is located because wills or probate
documents belonging to decedents from outside West Virginia or outside the
situate county can be recorded in the county of situs. Of course, this envisions
an ideal world in which executors, heirs, and devisees take affirmative action to
apprise the world of what happened to a decedent's interests. Nonetheless, the
ability to achieve clear record title exists for those who desire to complete the
paperwork.
In sum, classifying NPRIs as personal property will prohibit clear
record title. In contrast, classifying NPRIs as real property will enable clear
records of ownership of NPRIs to be maintained in the county in which those
minerals are located. This will allow for enhanced clarity and certainty of title,
which are important to the courts, lawyers, record-keepers, mineral owners, and
operators.

See W. VA. CODE §§ 40-1-8 to -9.
Id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 41-5-13 (allowing for probate of foreign will). By filing the
will within a year, the decedent's heirs are protected against bona fide purchasers. W. VA. CODE §
41-5-19.
100 Christopher J. Winton, ProbateHappens: How to Perform an Ancillary Administration to
West Virginia Real Estate, W. VA. LAw., May-June 2007, at 28, 28.
101 W. VA. CODE § 44-1-44 (requiring appraisal of property); W. VA. CODE § 44-1-13
98

99

(requiring affidavit showing heirs, distributes, devisees, and legatees of decedent).
102 McIntosh II, 28 S.E.2d 607, 616 (W. Va. 1943).
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C. Choice of Law: Applying West Virginia Law to NPRIs in Minerals
Within the State
West Virginia adheres to the doctrine known as lex loci rei sitae, which
means that the law of the state where real property is located governs a
transaction affecting the real property. 10 3 This doctrine is important for
maintaining "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied concerning the
transaction of property and the management of property." 10 4 As Williams and
Meyers explain, "classification of an interest as realty or personalty is of
significance in the determination of the governing law for a transaction since
the law of the situs will govern a transaction affecting real 05
estate whereas such
law may not govern a transaction not affecting real estate." 1
Classifying NPRIs as real property would certainly provide more
consistent treatment of NPRIs in the context of estate administration. Whereas
personal property is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile, real
106
property is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which it is located.
Classifying NPRIs as personal property would lead to practitioners and
abstractors having to learn and apply the law of 50 states to ascertain who owns
an NPRI in minerals in West Virginia. Instead, the Real Property Theory would
allow those wishing to ascertain ownership of an NPRI in West Virginia
minerals to look no further than West Virginia law. While treating NPRIs as
real property may not resolve all choice of law disputes concerning NPRIs, 107 it

103

Keesecker v. Bird, 490 S.E.2d 754, 766 (W. Va. 1997) ("We therefore hold that the choice

of law doctrine of lex loci rei sitae controls as to property located in this State.").
104

Id.

105

See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS 2013, supra note 6, § 213.9.
See In re Estate of Briggs, 134 S.E.2d 737, 740-41 (W. Va. 1964) ("'The law of the

106

domicile of the testator determines the validity of a holographic will as to personalty and the law
of the situs governs as to realty."' (quoting 94 C.J.S. Wills § 201, at 1038)); Keesecker, 490
S.E.2d at 766 ("It is a universal principal that real property is subject to the law of the country or
state within which it is situated.").
107
Other choice of law doctrines may result in disputes concerning NPRIs being resolved by
the law of other jurisdictions. For instance, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
often turned to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, which provides that the law
of the state with the most significant relationship to the dispute governs contractual disputes
unless the parties' contract contains a choice-of-law provision. Pen Coal Corp. v. William H.
McGee & Co., 903 F. Supp. 980, 983-984 (S.D.W. Va. 1995) (citing four West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals cases and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§
186-88 (1971 & Supp. 1989)). West Virginia also appears to follow the principle that the
doctrine of "lex rei sitae governs as to contracts relating to real estate, as to [1] the rights of
parties thereto, [2] the mode of transfer and alienation and [3] the nature and extent of the interest
therein." 4A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA & WEST VIRGINIA, Conflict of Laws,
Domicile and Residence § 30. It is certainly possible for a West Virginia court to view a dispute
concerning an instrument involving an NPRI as falling outside of the three categories where the
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may provide an additional justification as to why West Virginia law should
apply to transactions creating and affecting these interests in the choice of law
analysis. Thus, treating NPRIs as real property would enhance the predictability
of applicable law and outcome to the extent the lex loci rei sitae doctrine
prevails with respect to transactions creating and affecting NPRIs. The Real
Property Theory would also allow the West Virginia judiciary to shape the law
as to NPRI transactions affecting oil and gas development within its borders as
opposed to having to rely on extra-jurisdictional law.
D. Rational Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
The Personal Property Theory can lead to absurd jurisprudence. In
Hanson, the Arkansas Supreme Court aptly explained why viewing an NPRI as
a personal property interest vesting upon production is problematic:
It might also be argued that the estate would vest upon the
actual production of oil and gas-the view to which the Kansas
court was driven by reason of the royalty interest being
considered as personal property. But in Arkansas the royalty
interest is real property, and the severed oil or gas is
personalty; there is no need to confuse the two. A particular
producing well might be abandoned at any time, and even if
operated to exhaustion it would drain only the oil-bearing
stratum that it had penetrated, leaving untouched other deposits
that might lie above or below. It is hard for us to conceive of
an estate in real property which vests barrel by barrel or
stratum by stratum. In the analogous case of a profit 6 prendre,
such as the perpetual right to take game or fish from another's
land, the estate in real property is a present vested interest
which is unaffected by the rule against perpetuities ...
Although the owner of such a privilege acquires a personal
property interest whenever he bags a duck or lands a fish, this
action is merely an incident in the enjoyment of the estate in
real property.' 08
Indeed, the Personal Property Theory leaves us to wonder whether an NPRI
vested in a deeper stratum, such as the Marcellus shale, when the only
production during the period provided by the rule against perpetuities was from
shallow strata.
In sum, the Personal Property Theory leads only to legal and theoretical
complications for lawyers, judges, court and county administrators, mineral

latter lex rei sitae principle applies, and instead turning to the "most significant relationship" rule,
which may result in the application of another state's law.
108 Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (Ark. 1955) (citation omitted).
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owners, and operators, whereas the Real Property Theory provides for certainty
and clarity.
E. PartitionActions
The characterization of NPRIs also affects the rights of cotenants to
seek partition of commonly owned property. Under West Virginia law,
cotenants are provided the statutory right of partition under the West Virginia
Code. 109 This statute allows one cotenant to bring an action against his fellow
cotenant wherein he can ask the court to partition the commonly owned real
property in kind, allot the partitioned interest(s) to anyone who will pay for it,
or sell the real property sought to be partitioned through a public auction on the
courthouse steps.
In Stalnaker v. Stalnaker,111 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that all owners with an interest in the real property sought to be
partitioned are necessary parties to the partition action. 112 The court further
stated that "[a] decree of partition rendered in a suit in which all the persons in
interest were not parties is null and void." 113 The broad language of Stalnaker
suggests that those owning a real property interest in the minerals which are the
subject of a partition suit must be named as parties. 114
In light of Stalnaker's sweeping directive, the pertinent question
becomes whether an NPRI constitutes "an interest in land" of such character as
to require NPRI owners to be named as necessary parties in a partition action.
As discussed below, by characterizing an NPRI as an incorporeal hereditament
and looking at the basic purpose of partition actions, this concern can be
eliminated.
W. VA. CODE §§ 37-4-1 to -8 (2014). See generally John Mark Huff, Chop ItUp or Sell It
109
Off.- An Examination of the Evolution of West Virginia'sPartitionStatute, Il1 W. VA. L. REv.
169 (2008).
110 See Huff, supra note 109; see also W. VA. CODE §§ 37-4-1 to -8.
IH 80 S.E.2d 878 (W. Va. 1954).
112

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 ("In a suit to partition land, all known claimants to any part thereof, or

interest therein, or at the time suit is instituted, or whose interests are made to appear at any stage
of the cause, are necessary parties." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2; see also Syl. Pt. 2, O'Daniels v. City of Charleston, 490 S.E.2d 800 (W.
Va. 1997) (holding that the circuit court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus involving real
property when the property owners whose property was directly affected were not named as
parties: "When a court proceeding directly affects or determines the scope of rights or interests in
real property, any persons who claim an interest in the real property at issue are indispensable
parties to the proceeding. Any order or decree issued in the absence of those parties is null and
void."); Syl. Pt. 4, Oneal v. Stimson, 56 S.E. 889 (W. Va. 1907) ("A decree of partition rendered
in a suit in which all persons in interest were not parties is null and void.").
But see infra note 124 and accompanying text (arguing that when read in context,
114
Stalnaker's mandate is perhaps not as broad as its language suggests because the remedy of
partition is for cotenants as against other cotenants of the same estate).
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1. Lack of Cotenancy Supports Not Naming NPRI Owners in
Partition Suits
Assuming an NPRI is an incorporeal hereditament, the NPRI owner
should not be named in the partition action because an NPRI owner is not a
cotenant of the executive rights owner and has no possessory interest. Under
and/or
the statute, partition is a remedy for cotenants,' l5 joint tenants,
coparceners 117 against other cotenants, joint tenants and/or coparceners in the
same land. 18 Furthermore, although Stalnaker uses broad language when
discussing the parties that need to be named in a partition action, the court
115

A "cotenancy" is defined as "[a] tenancy with two or more coowners who have unity of

possession." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1603 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). Examples of
forms of cotenancy include a joint tenancy and tenancy in common. Id. A "tenancy in common"
is "[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having
an equal right to possess the whole property but no right of survivorship." Id. at 1604 (emphasis
added).
116
A "joint tenancy" is defined as "[a] tenancy with two or more coowners who take identical
interests simultaneously by the same instrument and with the same right of possession." Id. at
1603 (emphasis added). "A joint tenancy differs from a tenancy in common because each joint
Id. A key feature of a joint tenancy is
tenant has a right of survivorship to the other's share ....
the four unities, which one commentator describes as follows:
In a joint tenancy there are said by Blackstone to be four unities, to wit, unity
of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession, or, in other
words, joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the
same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one
and the same undividedpossession.
2 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 418 (3d ed. 1947) (emphasis added).
117
A "coparcener" is defined as "[a] person to whom an estate descends jointly, and who
holds it as an entire estate; a person who has become a concurrent owner as a result of descent."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (9th ed. 2009). As one commentator explains,
Coparceners constitute a single heir, and they occupy a position intermediate
between joint tenants and tenants in common. Like joint tenants they have
unity of title, interest and possession; like tenants in common, their estate is
not subject to the doctrine of survivorship, and if there are three coparceners
and one dies, her share passes separately to her heirs or devisee, not to the
survivors, though the unity of possession continues. It follows that unity of
time is not necessary to constitute coparcenary, for if a man has two
daughters to whom his estate descends and one dies leaving a son, such son
and the surviving daughter will be coparceners.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting G.C. CHESHIRE, MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 553 (3d ed.
1933)).
See W. VA. CODE § 37-4-1 (2014) ("Tenants in common, joint tenants, and coparceners of
118
real property, including minerals, . . . shall be compelled to make partition."); see also Brown v.
Brown, 67 S.E. 596, 596 (W. Va. 1910) ("[A] life tenant cannot compel a partition among
remaindermen. A life tenant has not a particle of interest in estate in remainder, [is] not a
cotenant with remaindermen, and nobody can have partition unless he have title to the thing to be
partitioned. A life tenant owning with one or more others a life estate can have that estate divided
between himself and co-owners of the life estate; but what colorable right has he to demand a
partition among remaindermen?" (citations omitted)).
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likely intended its holding to only apply to the cotenants who were not named
in the action. 119

The critical stick in the bundle that a cotenant must have as an element
of the partition statute is possession of the estate. 120 In contrast, an incorporeal
hereditament is a non-possessory interest by definition, and thus, NPRI owners
do not have possession of the real estate, are not co-tenants, and lack the ability
to partition the land. 121 Because cotenants, joint tenants, and coparceners all
hold an equal right to possession, and an NPRI, if treated as an incorporeal
hereditament, is non-possessory, NPRI owners are not proper parties to a
partition suit because they are not in a cotenancy, joint tenancy, or coparcenary
with the executive rights owners of the mineral estate. As one commentator
explains,
It should be bome in mind that the owner of a mere royalty
interest has no present or prospective possessory interest in the
land; that he owns no part of the minerals (as such) in place;
that he does not become a cotenant in the mineral estate; that
he cannot, therefore, demand or be forced into an involuntary
partition of the mineral fee estate; and that his interest is
merely a present vested incorporeal interest in the land. 122

119
See Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 80 S.E.2d 878, 883 (W. Va. 1954) ("The trial court did not
attempt to ascertain the interest of any of the co-tenants of the land .... A decree of partition of
the land should not have been made, nor should the land have been directed to be sold before
ascertaining the interest of all the coparceners." (emphasis added)).
120 See supra notes 12-14; see also Cales v. Ford, 28 S.E.2d 429, 436 (W. Va. 1943) ("[T]he
right to possession is the test of the right to partition.").
121 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 473 cmt. a (1944) ("As the law has developed,
corporeal interests are, in general, coincident with possessory interests; incorporeal interests with
non-possessory interests."); see also id. § 450 cmt. c ("[Djespite criticism which may properly be
made with respect to the connotations of the words 'incorporeal' and 'corporeal,' the
classification of interests into incorporeal and corporeal corresponds to a fundamental difference
between nonpossessory and possessory interests and is therefore a useful one."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.2(1) (2000) (defining an easement as "a nonpossessory right to enter
and use land in the possession of another"). Although an easement provides for limited use of the
land, it is still a non-possessory interest:
[T]he nonpossessory feature of an easement differentiates it from an estate in
land. Thus, the holder of an affirmative easement may only use the land
burdened by the easement; the holder may not occupy and possess the realty
as does an estate owner... [A]n easement burdens land possessed by
someone other than the easement holder. This characteristic is a corollary of
the nonpossessory element of an easement. It emphasizes the distinction
between possession and use and highlights the fact that a possessor and an
easement holder can simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land.
JON W. BRUCE & JAMES E. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 1. 1, at 1-3
to 1-5 (2014).
122 Lee Jones, Jr., Non-ParticipatingRoyalty, 26 TEX. L. REv. 569, 569 (1948).
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Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that
parties with an interest in proceeds of mineral development hold "no tenancy in
common" with the mineral owner and are therefore "not entitled to
partition." 123 In Collins, two brothers received from their father the following
interest: "And in the event there is one or more wells drilled on said farm, then
the proceeds of same shall be divided equally between my sons ....
24 Their
sister, Clara Stalnaker, had "the fee simple title to the property, subject to the
provision as to grantor's maintenance and support and the then one producing
well," which was already drilled upon the property. 125 The brothers sought to
partition their interest from their sister's interest. 26 The court interpreted the
27
conveyances and held that the brothers had only a royalty interest.
Consequently, because the brothers "held no tenancy in common with the
appellant, Clara Stalnaker,
they [were] not entitled to partition or any other
128
relief in this suit."

123

See Collins v. Stalnaker, 48 S.E.2d 430, 436 (W. Va. 1948).

124

Id. at 431.

125
126

Id. at 436.
Id. at 432.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 436. A Texas Court of Appeals applied a similar approach under Texas's former

partition statute to hold in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom that joinder of owners of nonpossessory royalty interests (i.e., NPRIs) in a partition suit between owners of a mineral
leasehold estate is not required. See 638 S.W.2d 231, 234-35 (Tex. App. 1982). The Ostrom
court stated that "[t]he general rule in a partition case is that all owners of property must be
joined." Id. at 233 (citations omitted). Under Texas law, a "joint owner" is "one who owns any
interest in the real estate entitling him to joint possession and use." Id. at 234 (quoting Tex. Co.
v. Cain, 177 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)). The Ostrom court held that a "lessee has a
corporeal interest in land and may compel partition, but the owners of non-possessory interests
do not have standing to demand or defeat a partition." Id. at 233. Accordingly, "[I]essors of a
mineral estate and royalty interest owners, therefore, are not 'joint owners' of the mineral estate
for purposes of art. 6082, the partition statute." Id. at 234. The reason is that the lease divests "the
grantor (lessor) of the right to possess, use or dispose of the oil and gas in, upon or under the land
in question, and invests these rights in the grantee (lessee) of the lease." Id. In regard to royalty
owners, whether the minerals are leased or not, a pure royalty owner is not required to be joined
to a partition action because that "interest would neither be increased or decreased by a partition,
but would remain constant and unaffected; thus, 'a nonpossessory interest is not affected by a
partition and the owner of such interest is not a necessary party."' Id. (quoting Douglas v.
Butcher, 272 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954)); see also Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 144 F. Supp. 192, 199 (E.D. Tex. 1956) (holding that a mere royalty owner "has no right of
possession of any portion of the mineral estate, and therefore, has no right to compel a partition
of the mineral estate"). However, the Ostrom court cautioned that although lessors and royalty
interest owners are not required to be joined in a partition action, "it would be wise to join the
lessors and the royalty interest owners." Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d at 235. Additionally, Texas courts
will allow joinder of these owners if the facts show that their interests will be affected. See Ohrt
v. Union Gas Corp., 398 S.W.3d 315, 335-36 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the parties that were both lessors and royalty recipients to
be joined where the royalties may have been paid prior to filing the unit designation, the
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2. NPRI Owners Are Similar to Lienholders, Who Are Not Required
To Be Named in Partition Suits in West Virginia
Second, assuming the NPRI is an incorporeal hereditament, an NPRI
owner is much like a lienholder, and West Virginia law does not require
lienholders to be made parties to a partition suit.129 While the rights associated
with a lien and an NPRI appear to vest immediately, the full benefits of
ownership are not realized until some future event; in the case of a lien, that
30
event is foreclosure, and in the case of an NPRI, that event is production.
Additionally, transfers of property in a partition action ordinarily do not affect a
lienholder's interest therein if such interest is properly recorded. 131
Depending on the type of incorporeal hereditament to which an NPRI
is compared, a transfer of the mineral estate in a partition action should not

lessors/royalty recipients would not have been able to protect their interests, and the oil and gas
company would have been exposed to multiple or inconsistent obligations).
See Tompkins v. Kyle, 122 S.E. 150, 152 (W. Va. 1924) ("[I]n a suit for partition, it is not
129
necessary to make lien creditors of a decedent parties to the suit."). There are two exceptions to
the general rule that lienholders do not need to be named in a partition suit: (1) lienholders should
be named when the partition is meant to serve the additional purpose of determining and
satisfying outstanding liens on the property; and (2) lienholders might need to be named when
there are special circumstances that might impede a fair sale of the property. See id. at Syl. Pt. 3
("[I]n [a partition] suit the holder of a trust lien debt on the land is not a necessary party, yet if
such lien creditor be made a party and the bill and proceedings are for the additional purpose of
ascertaining the liens and satisfying them out of the proceeds of a sale prayed for, it is error to
decree a sale without having the legal title before the court."); Helmick v. Kraft, 99 S.E. 325, 328
(W. Va. 1919) ("We are not to be understood.., as holding that adult parties may not consent to
the presence of lien creditors, or that creditors may not come in [the partition suit] with the assent
of adult owners, in cases in which only adults are interested; nor as holding that a creditor may
never be a necessary party, in the absence of consent. If the debts are uncertain in amount, or
there are conflicting claims of priority, or other circumstances constituting an impediment to a
fair sale, or there is a mortgagee in possession, after condition broken, lien creditors might be
necessary parties.").
130

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY

(MORTGAGES)

§

4.1 cmt. a(2) (1992)

("The substantial majority of American jurisdictions follow the lien theory. Under this theory, the
mortgagee acquires only a 'lien' on the mortgaged real estate and the mortgagor retains both
legal and equitable title and the right to possession until foreclosure or a deed in lieu of
foreclosure."); Meyers, supra note 15, at 413 ("It is believed ... that [nonparticipating royalty
and non-executive mineral interests], treated as incorporeal hereditaments, are presently vested,
although payment may be contingent on the execution of leases.").
131 See Tompkins, 122 S.E. at 152 ("The purpose of a partition suit is not to settle
indebtedness, but to divide the inheritance between those entitled thereto, and if a division be
made[,] the liens are not disturbed."); Helmick, 99 S.E. at 328 ("If the estate is partitioned, the
lien of the incumbrance fixed on an undivided part of it will, after the division and allotment, be
confined to the particular share or part allotted to the party creating the incumbrance; and, if the
state is sold, the purchaser will take it subject to the lien of the incumbrance upon the undivided
share of the party against whom the mortgage or judgment was held before sale." (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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affect an NPRI. 132 At least one case has held that pure royalty owners (i.e.,
NPRI owners) are not necessary parties to a partition action because their
interests remain "constant and unaffected" despite the outcome. 33 Thus, given
the similarities between lienholders and NPRI owners, the rationale that
supports not naming lienholders as defendants in a partition suit, namely, that
their interests are not affected
by the outcome, would also appear to support not
34
naming NPRI owners.1

3. No Case Law Appears To Require NPRI or Incorporeal
Hereditament Owners To Be Named in Partition Suits
Third, no case law was found in Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, New
Mexico, or Wyoming-the jurisdictions specifically holding an NPRI to be real
property-requiring an NPRI owner to be named in a suit for partition.' 3 5
Additionally, no legal authority in West Virginia was found to affirmatively
indicate that an individual who holds an easement, lease, license or other

132 See Myers, supra note 15, at 410-15 (exploring the classification of nonparticipating
royalty interests and non-executive mineral interests as three types of incorporeal
hereditaments-real covenants, rent, and covenants in aid of rent-and noting that by classifying
an NPRI as a rent or covenant in aid of rent, the NPRI can run with the land without the many
analytical issues associated with whether an NPRI can run with the land if treated as a real
covenant). Practically speaking, if a title opinion has revealed NPRI owners through an
examination of record title, any putative grantee in a partition sale should have constructive
notice of the interest.
"' Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d at 234. For additional discussion on this point, see supra note 128.
134 Despite characterizing an NPRI owner as a personal property interest, Kansas has held that
NPRI owners are not indispensable parties to an action to cancel a lease because an NPRI
owner's position remains unchanged despite the outcome of the lease cancellation action.
Dexter v. Brake, 174 P.3d 924, 926 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). The court in Dexter offered the
following reasoning:
Absent parties with.., a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest in lands
subject to an oil and gas lease are not so situated that the disposition of a
cancellation action in their absence may ... substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests .... the [NPRI] remains intact, leaving
the interest in precisely the same position after the cancellation of the lease as
it was before the lease was executed.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 9. The reasoning of the Kansas Court of Appeals arguably applies to a partition
action as well as an action for cancellation of a lease. An NPRI remains the same no matter who
owns the corresponding executive rights, so NPRI owners should not be deemed indispensable
parties to a partition action.
135 Florida has held that an NPRI owner has no right to demand partition. See Welles v. Berry,
434 So. 2d 982, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("The owner of the nonparticipating royalty
interest cannot demand partition of the mineral fee estate and has no right to execute any
leases."). In addition to these jurisdictions, Texas's Court of Appeals has also held that a pure
royalty owner is not a necessary party to a partition action. See Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d at 234. For
more on Texas's stance that an owner of a pure royalty interest is not a necessary party to a
partition action, see supra note 128.
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incorporeal hereditament covering a tract of property is required to be named in
a suit seeking to partition the real property in which the individual has an
interest.1 36 Moreover, a lease is preserved in a partition suit by statute in West
Virginia. 137 Therefore, it would appear that an NPRI owner's right to receive
royalties from any existing leases would be similarly preserved.
4. Naming NPRI Owners in Partition Suits Would Be Futile
Regardless of how an NPRI is characterized, naming NPRI owners in a
partition action is pointless because the purpose of partition actions is to resolve
disputes among concurrent owners of property. 138 Practically speaking, the
need to partition an NPRI owner should never arise because NPRI owners have
no say in the production of the minerals in the mineral estate and cannot
impede production or a common development scheme. 139 The only owners who
can impede production by refusing to execute leases are the executive rights
140
owners, and thus, only those owners should be named in the partition action.
Arguably, if an NPRI is to be characterized as an incorporeal hereditament, but the NPRI
owner does not make his or her interest of record, a partition decree could potentially deprive
such owner of his or her interest. See Fanti v. Welsh, 161 S.E.2d 501, 505 (W. Va. 1968) (where
plaintiffs claimed easement to maintain private sewer through defendants' land but neither
defendants nor defendants' predecessors in title had knowledge of the sewer, plaintiffs' easement
"extinguished by the conveyance of the property" to the purchaser without notice of the
easement). A purchaser is considered to have "such knowledge as he would have acquired by the
exercise of ordinary diligence," including knowledge of those interests which are of record. Id.
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that where a purchaser of land
for value had a title opinion done by an attomey and that opinion did not uncover the easement,
the buyer took the land free of the easement. Id. at 506.
137 See W. VA. CODE § 37-4-7 (2014).
138 See 3 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 21.05 (2014) ("When two or more persons find
themselves owning concurrent... interests in the same land, oil painting, bond, or other asset,
one or more of these persons may wish to end the relationship with the others. The law of
partition and judicially ordered sales provides a remedy. It specifies who can compel such a
severance and who can be subjected to such a severance irrespective of his own preference, that
is, who has the power to initiate such a procedure and who must respond to it."); see also Huff,
supra note 109, at 169-70 ("What happens when co-tenants cannot agree on how to use a parcel
of land? Worse yet, what happens when one faction of co-tenants wants to sell the property while
the other faction wants the property partitioned in kind, particularly in West Virginia? In early
England, there was no statutory provision for an action to partition land; rather, it was an action
created at common law, but these common law provisions were later codified. Much like
England, every state in the United States has a statute dealing with partitioning real property
either in kind or by sale.").
139 See Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963) (noting that "the distinguishing
characteristics of a non-participating royalty interest" include the fact that "the owner has no
right to do any act or thing to discover and produce the oil and gas" and "no right to grant
136

leases").
See id. (noting that the owner of"an interest in minerals in place.., has the right to do any
140

and all acts necessary to discover and produce oil and gas").
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F. If Treated as IncorporealHereditaments,NPRIs Should Survive Tax
Sales

There is also debate as to how to treat NPRIs in the context of sales of
minerals for delinquent property taxes. Treating NPRIs as real property may
mean that any outstanding NPRIs at the time of the tax sale were sold to the tax
sale purchaser.
Although West Virginia law does not appear to provide clear guidance
as to whether incorporeal hereditaments are affected by tax sales of the estates
to which they pertain, the majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue have
determined that easements and covenants are not extinguished by tax sales. 14'
Thus, if West Virginia were to adopt the majority approach by preserving
incorporeal hereditaments such as easements and covenants when minerals are
sold for delinquent taxes, it should follow that NPRIs, if treated as incorporeal
hereditaments, should also be preserved.
V.

THE REAL PROPERTY THEORY IS THE RATIONAL CHOICE FOR WEST
VIRGINIA

West Virginia is faced with a square-peg, round-hole dilemma: the
NPRI does not neatly fit into the traditional property interest molds forged by
the state's inconsistent, centuries-old jurisprudence. Williams and Meyers
suggest that courts should consider "whether the oil and gas interest generally
has the important characteristics which distinguish[] the interest described by a
particular statute or common law rule sought to be applied" as opposed to
trying to fit various oil and gas interests into "the straightjacket of common law
concepts."' 142 While this ad hoc approach is not without merit, it would seem to
inject even more uncertainty into the law governing mineral interests as
subjective determinations may abound as to which property characteristics
amount to "distinguishing." In a state that has already gained a reputation for
having an arbitrary judiciary, 143 the more syllogistic, "straightjacket" approach
that Williams and Meyers challenge would provide some much-needed
certainty to industry participants. 144 Furthermore, although Williams and
Meyers appear to support a more case-by-case approach, they also conclude
that "in states in which the classification question has not been decided as to a
141 See generally Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, Easement, Servitude, or Covenant as
Affected by Salefor Taxes, 7 A.L.R. 5th 187 (1992) (discussing cases that consider the effect of a

sale of real property for delinquent property taxes on private easements, servitudes, and
restrictive covenants).
142

1 WILLIAMS&MEYERS2013,supra note
6, § 213.

143

See
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REFORM FOUND.,
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HELLHOLES

2013/2014,

at

19

http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf
the past decade, West Virginia has been included among the top 5 Judicial Hellholes.").
144 See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS 2013,supra note 6, § 213.
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particular interest, classification as realty rather than as personalty is preferable
if the particular interest has the duration of a freehold."'
In line with this reasoning, the Real Property Theory is the most
rational choice for West Virginia. Classifying NPRIs as interests in real
property will promote clarity of title, avoid complex rule against perpetuities
analysis, allow West Virginia to shape the law regarding oil and gas
transactions within its border, and create more predictable jurisprudence. Most
jurisdictions have adopted this approach and have consistently pointed out the
faulty logic in the Personal Property Approach. In contrast, should West
Virginia adopt the Personal Property Theory, it would join Kansas-the only
other jurisdiction to adopt the Personal Property Theory-in the minority camp.
Given the fact that Kansas's courts have strongly criticized their own approach
and may soon change it, West Virginia would likely be the only jurisdiction to
follow this approach. The Personal Property Theory does not provide for clarity
or certainty of title and would cause conveyances to regularly run afoul of the
rule against perpetuities.
VI. CONCLUSION

In light of West Virginia's jurisprudence, majority theory, and practical
considerations, an NPRI should be properly classified under West Virginia law
as a real property interest in the form of an incorporeal hereditament. Although
West Virginia case law discussing oil and gas royalties lends some support to
the Personal Property Theory, careful examination of these decisions reveals
that they are outdated and inconsistent. Adopting the Real Property Theory
would comport with the majority of oil and gas jurisdictions, which have held
that an NPRI is a real property interest and analogized it to various types of
incorporeal hereditaments. Only Kansas has classified NPRIs as personal
property, and this decision has been severely criticized not only by authoritative
commentators and courts of other jurisdictions, but also by Kansas's own
courts. Finally, the practical implications of the Real Property Theory make it
the best choice for West Virginia. Classifying an NPRI as real property in the
form of an incorporeal hereditament will allow for certainty of title, avoid
complications associated with the rule against perpetuities, preserve the
integrity of the partition action process, and provide for greater predictability in
estate administration and choice of law questions. In sum, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, if given the opportunity, should hold that an NPRI
is a real property interest in the form of an incorporeal hereditament.
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